



Washington, D.C. 20505

17-80804  
7

Dear Zbig,

Attached are papers addressing issues you expressed interest in during our conversation on 22 August 1977. These are our views on the Soviet and East European assessments of our attitude on human rights issues at CSCE, [redacted]

STAT  
STAT

Yours,

STANSFIELD TURNER

Att: a/s

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
The White House

(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE)

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2004/03/23 : CIA-RDP80M00165A002200100014-5

31 August 1977

SUBJECT: Have we perceived any sense from the Soviets or Eastern Europeans that we are compromising our position on human rights with respect to our attitudes toward the CSCE agenda? Are we risking an appearance of backing off on our human rights stand?

1. We do not believe that the Soviets or Eastern Europeans have interpreted our attitudes toward the CSCE agenda as an indication that we have compromised our position on human rights. We have no concrete information on their assessment of our performance at the Belgrade preliminary talks, but we believe that they would have reached this judgment only if we had given up our insistence that adequate time and means be provided to allow a detailed review of implementation at the fall meeting. Further, their persistent efforts to persuade our allies that the US position on human rights issues is unnecessarily provocative suggests that they continue to see the US as a determined proponent of these issues.

2. At the same time, they must be relieved that their worst fears--that the US would take advantage of the preliminary talks in Belgrade to publicly pillory their performance on human rights issues--did not materialize. This development, along with their assessment of the President's Charleston speech, probably contributed to the positive tone of Brezhnev's most recent public remarks on CSCE and American foreign policy.

3. We therefore think it probable that the Soviets and Eastern Europeans presently consider it less likely than they did earlier this year that the US will deliberately seek a public confrontation on human rights issues at Belgrade. However, their final judgment on the durability of our position on human rights is likely to be formed more on the basis of the seriousness with which we pursue our interests within the working groups and deliberative sessions at Belgrade than by the immediate level of media attention.

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2004/03/23 : CIA-RDP80M00165A002200100014-5

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/03/23 : CIA-RDP80M00165A002200100014-5

Next 9 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/03/23 : CIA-RDP80M00165A002200100014-5

<input type="checkbox"/>	UNCLASSIFIED	<input type="checkbox"/>	CONFIDENTIAL	<input type="checkbox"/>	SECRET
--------------------------	--------------	--------------------------	--------------	--------------------------	--------

Approved For Release 2004/03/23 : CIA-RDP80M00165A002200100014-5

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**

**Routing Slip**

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	D/DCI/IC		X *		
4	DDS&T				
5	DDI	X (paras 9, 10, 11, 13)			
6	DDA				
7	DDO	X (para 2)			
8	D/DCI/NI	X (para 4)			
9	GC				
10	LC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/Pers				
14	D/S				
15	DTR				
16	A/DCI/PA				
17	AO/DCI				
18	C/IPS				
19	DCI/SS				
20	ES		X		
21					
22					
		SUSPENSE	_____ Date _____		

**Remarks:**

To 5, 7, and 8:  
For appropriate action. Please make no additional copy of entire memo.

\* Received memo with paras. 1, 3, 5, 6

*Automatic suspense*

Approved For Release 2004/03/23 : CIA-RDP80M00165A002200100014-5

STAT